1st Campaign Report: 1986 Soviet Amphibious Landing in Northern Germany ('Naval Command 2021' Rules) - Part 2

Recap: We conducted a rehearsal for the (never happened) 1986 Soviet landing (behind NATO lines) of the West-German Baltic coast on 29th September 2024 (see Battle Report 10th Oct.). Executed the first part of the tactical play on 1st Dec. in approx. 4 hrs. (see Battle Report 4th Dec.); with some minor damage to 2 Soviet covering Forces (1 old Sverdlov-class cruiser and 1 Udaloy ASW-destroyer) and 1 sunk Type 206 West-German submarine. Following is Part 2, conducted on 15th December in approx. 5 hrs. From now I call it a Campaign Report, as this Part 2 will be followed with possible 2 other reports covering the actual fight on the beach and the movement inland of the Soviet Land Forces. To speed things up a little, the starting point for Part 2 was 15-20 nm. from the beach (as the max. convoy speed of the Landing Forces was just 5 kts./turn.).

Set up: The set-up and scenario was the same as Part 1: 1:3000 ship miniatures & 1:600 aircraft on a 4 x 6 feet sea mat, with a 'custom made' cloth beach mat on one of the 4 ft. sides superimposed. As a distance scale we used (recommended Rule Book): 1 cm. = 1 nautical mile. General war existed between NATO and the Warchau-Pact, with lots of fighting in both Germanies. The Soviet Amphibious Strike Group was somehow slimmed down with regards to covering forces: The Landing Ships (Ivan Rogov-, Alligator-, Ropucha-, Polnocny- and AIST-class units) were guarded by 1 x Sverdlov-class cruiser (flag ship), 2 x Moskva-class helicopter carriers, 2 x modern Sovremenny DDG, 1 x modern Udaloy ASW DDG, 1 x old Kashin AAW destroyer, 1 Krivak III frigate and 1 Kilo-class submarine. Lots of Ka-25 and Ka-27 ASW-helicopters and 6 Mi-8/17 transport helo's with 3 attack helo's. At the nearest East German airfield 4 Su-24 Fencer bombers were available to the Strike Group commander for air-strikes.

The West-German coast was guarded by 3 x mobile 152 mm vehicles (actual: 'Dana' Czech wheeled Howitzers; scale: 6 mm.) on one of the islands, a MPA patrolling the coast (West-German Brequet 'Atlantic' was replaced by an UK 'Nimrod', fitted out for ASW) and at sea a small force of 1 Danish Type 207 submarine and 1 'Niels Juel' corvette was present, more than 90-100 nm. away from the Soviets. NATO had 6 x Danish F-16's available on a nearby Danish airfield for maritime tasks.

The aim of this Naval War Game was to continue the tactical phase, but also to try out NGS (Naval Gunfire Support by ships; see Chapter 23 'Gunnery' and Ch. 31 'Littoral Operations' for this) and Air Strike planning (Ch. 25). To make it less predictable when an air strike would happen, we decided that if a potential target was detected the airstrike would only be launched after the D10 dice would present '8' or higher. First turn (after a target detection) you were only allowed to throw 1 D10 dice for this, second turn: 2 x D10, etc. If you were consistently unsuccessful, the airstrike would happen at the 4th turn (after detection of the target) anyway.

Turn 1. NATO had the initiative. The Nimrod MPA flew at medium altitude with her search radar active. Both Danish vessels coming from the North were passive; the Type 207 submarine (Type 209 from NAVWAR) was at shallow depth. All Soviet combatants were active on radar (based on Part 1; the Amphibious Strike Group was previously detected and attacked by NATO), but the landing ships remained silent (to 'hide' within the Strike Group). The Soviet Kilo-class sub was deployed at the open sea flank of the Strike Group. The Soviet ships continued their course towards the southern beach and deployed the first amphibious wave (6 troop transport Mi-8 helo's & 4 AIST-class air cushion vehicles). A Soviet SAG (Surface Action Group), consisting of the damaged Sverdlov-class cruiser and 1 Sovremenny DDG had set sail towards the small island, to neutralize the NATO coastal gunnery threat (which had slightly damaged the Udaloy DDG in Part 1). A Ka-27 helicopter was deployed at sea skimming height to look out for those guns. In the detection Phase the Ka-27 visually detected the most western 152 mm wheeled gun. The Udaloy DDG detected the Nimrod, but the Nimrod was unable to detect the modern Udaloy at 45 nm. Because of her modern search radar the Nimrod was allowed a second detection (own house rules) and was able to detect the larger (& older) Moskva helicopter carrier at 64 nm. Both Russian and Danish submarines (silent running) didn't detect each other at shallow depth at intermediate range. All other detections were unsuccessful. 

During combat phase the Sverdlov cruiser remaining operational 6-inch guns (only 2 fwd triple turrets) opened fire at a range of 20 nm. and destroyed the mobile 152 mm coastal gun (battle damage assessment by Ka-27). It was good to see that Naval Command 2021 Chapter 23 and 32 came to the same conclusion with regard to damage due to Naval Gunfire Support (NGS). 

Turn 2. NATO kept initiative. Sensor status unchanged. The 1st Soviet amphibious wave did set foot on the West German beach and started unloading. Given the tactical situation, I realized I would like the Nimrod MPA to deploy a sonobuoy field to look for a possible Soviet submarine at the open sea side of the Soviet Strike Group.

Unfortunately I couldn't find sufficient suggestions in the Rule Book how to do that... So we made at the spot a new house rule: based on the passive sonar table of Chapter 17.5 we decided that sonobuoys (at the surface) were limited to intermediate/close range to detect submarines. Partly based on own experience, I suggested to work with a 10 nm line of sonobuoys, presented by 2 outer sonobuoys. During the detection phase, an MPA was in this way allowed to detect all units within intermediate range of that deployed sonobuoy line and such that both outside buoys were allowed one passive sonar detection on each target. Possible results (per possible target): 2 x no detection, 1 passive detection/1 no detection (result: passive detection, but no location) and 2 passive detections. Only with 2 detections a MPA was able to make a cross bearing, resulting into an exact location. We agreed on this new 'house rule'. Nimrod detected with active radar the Sverdlov-class cruiser and with ESM the 2nd Moskva-class helicopter carrier. Based on this, it was decided that the Soviet Amphib Strike Gp was detected and a request for air strike (by F-16) was sent. The Soviet and Danish submarines closed in on each other at 'silent running' and were unable to detect each other... The Ka-27 helo of the Soviet SAG found a second 152 mm. coastal gun.

Both ships closed in to surprise this 152 mm. gun as well. During the combat phase the NATO coastal gun (initiative!) opened fire on the Sverdlov cruiser (size 8) and scored 3 damage markers. The Sverdlov returned fire with both forward triple 152 mm. guns and neutralized the gun ashore (size 1). During the following Damage Control phase the Sverdlov-class cruiser was able to put out the fire and stop the floods. The Soviet admiral onboard realized he might run out of luck next time, so decided to call in an air attack (Su-24 bomber) on the island.

Turn 3. USSR got initiative. Sensor status unchanged. The first amphibious wave unloaded the assault troops. The now more damaged Soviet flagship turned away from the island, guarded by the 100% operational Sovremenny-class DDG. The Soviet and Danish submarines closed in on each other at 'silent running' and were still unable to detect each other...(now at a range of 30 nm.)  During the navigation phase Nimrod MPA deployed the sonobuoy line. Niels Juel class closed in the Soviet Strike Gp. Throwing 1 Dice, the Soviets got a '8' and their Su-24 air attack was put on the table! NATO had 'no joy' with regards to the F-16 strike... Detection phase: The sonobuoy line did have the Kilo-class submarine zone and the Kashin class DDG within intermediate range. The submarine was not detected, but the Kashin DDG was with 1 sonobuoy-bearing (passive detection, but no location at 21 nm.). Nimrod unable to get an ESM bearing on the Kashin... Niels Juel unable to get an ESM-bearing on the retreating SAG at 77 nm.

In the attack phase 4 x SU-24 'Fencer' bombers dropped a lot of bombs on the buildings at the West German island, including the remaining 152 mm. mobile gun. Gun neutralized.

Turn 4. USSR kept initiative. Sensor status unchanged. The following amphibious wave got into position. The now empty troop transport helo's returned to the ships. 1 Mi-24 'Hind' helicopter remained above the beach supporting the assault troops. NATO used 2 D10's to throw a '8' or higher (for F-16's air attack) but was unsuccessful. The Ka-27 helo landed on the Sovremenny DDG (Soviet SAG). The Kilo-class sub did detect the Danish Type 207 sub passively. However the Nimrod detected via sonobuoys the Kilo-class as well. 1 marker; no location. The Type 207 was unable to detect her opponent.

Turn 5. USSR kept initiative. Sensor status unchanged. 4 AIST-class air-cushion vehicles returned to the Task Force. Wave 2 (several Ropucha-class Landing Ship Tanks) beached their ships at the beach. Troop transport helo's landed on both Moskva-class carriers for refuel & reload. NATO used 3 D10's to throw a '8' or higher (for F-16's air attack): again unsuccessful! Niels Juel class corvette continued her course towards the Soviet Strike Group. Now at 67 nm of retreating SAG (house rule: range RGM-84 Harpoon missile: 70 nm. - and not '50'). The only detection Nimrod was capable of: ESM bearing on Sovremenny (at 44 nm.). Still radar contact on Sverdlov. 

Based on this targeting information, Niels Juel fired her 8 RGM-84 Harpoon missiles towards Sverdlov. As they are sea skimming, SA-N-7 and AK630 close-in weapon system of the escorting Sovremenny-class DDG opened fire, resulting in 2 splashes. The 37 mm AA-guns of the Sverdlov cruiser didn't have a chance. 6 Harpoons did hit the already damaged cruiser and the cruiser went down engulfed with black smoke and fire. However, the admiral and some crew members were rescued by the Sovremenny. He asked for a helo transfer to the Moskva-class carrier to continue his command of the Amphibious Strike Group.

 Turn 6. NATO got initiative. Niels Juel went active on radar & sonar. Partly because she expected a counter attack by escorting Sovremenny but also she feared a possible encounter with the Kilo-class sub. As this was the 4th turn after the F-16 air attack request, the attack package showed up (house rule: automatically). Both submarines (silent running) were now very close: 8 nm. The 3rd amphibious wave (2 x Alligator-class) arrived at the beach. The Ropucha's were still off-loading their units. Both Moskva class carriers were in the process of re-launching the troop transport helo's for a second air lift towards the beaches. The Soviet Strike Group did send 2 Ka-25/27 helo's and 2 destroyers (Sovremenny & Kashin) towards the location where the 8 Harpoons came from, to investigate how large the attacking NATO Taskgroup was... Both Danish ships remained unable to detect the Kilo-class sub. However the Type 207 was able to detect with her passive sonar the fast sailing Kashin class at 40 nm distance! The Nimrod went to low altitude, to remain outside the AAW bubble of the incoming Soviet destroyers and be able to attack the Kilo-class sub (if located). The Kilo had a passive sonar detection on Niels Juel. 

In the Combat phase 6 Danish F-16's attacked the Moskva-class carrier 'Moskva'. I couldn't find a specific anti-shipping armament package for these Danish F-16's, so I chose a GBU-31 JDAM package (found at the Naval Command 2021 Facebook page) at sea skimming level. Both helikopter carriers could only use their 57 mm. twin guns against this low flying threat (SA-N-3 unable), with no results.

The nearby Krivak III opened fire with SA-N-4 and splashed 1 F-16 at an impressive range of 8 nm. (following the Rules; SA-N-4 can be used <12 nm.). 10 JDAM's landed on the 'Moskva' (resulting in 20 damage points) and the ship went down...just after she flew off her transport helo's. The 5 remaining F-16's did zig-zag between the ships, flew towards the nearest island en cleared the scene.

Turn 7. USSR got initiative. Sensor status unchanged. The 4 returning AIST-class picked up survivors of the F-16 air attack on the 'Moskva'. The admiral arrived by helo with a limited number of his staff at the remaining Moskva-class helicopter carrier and exercised command from there. All landing ships were at the beach now (unopposed!), deploying troops and vehicles in large numbers. The troop carrying helo wave was flying towards the beach. The Nimrod MPA dropped a second sonobuoy line to have a better chance to localize the Soviet submarine. Flying low, her radar & ESM intercepts were less successful. Unfortunately she was still unable to localize the Kilo-class submarine, and the remaining Moskva-class carrier... One of the Soviet helo's was able to detect the Niels Juel-class corvette. 

Resulting in a busy combat phase: The Sovremenny launched, based on targeting info by the helo, a salvo of 4 x SS-N-22 'Sunburn' high speed anti-ship missiles at range 45 nm. According to the Naval Command 2021 rules these missiles (weight: 4,000 kg. speed Mach 2,2) were sea skimming!? Anyhow, following the rules and unlucky dice, Niels Juel was unable to splash any SS-N-22...  3 lock-on's resulting into a sunken corvette...See below for my comments regarding that engagement. The second attack was by the Soviet Kilo-class sub on Niels Juel. She fired 4 guided torpedo's in bearing-only launch at a range of 10 nm. (on passive sonar detection) but unlucky dice resulted in 4 x miss! The third attack was a SA-N-7 engagement by the Sovremenny against the Nimrod at low altitude at a range of 23 nm! Possible within the rules (SA-N-7 can engage air targets within the AD distance band 12 to 30 nm. range). Nimrod splashed...

After 5 hours naval gaming we went for dinner. End of Part 2. Amphibious landing was successful, but the Soviet Amphibious Strike Group lost 1 Helicopter carrier (with essential deck space for Mi-8/Mi-24 helo's), 1 old cruiser (with relevant NGS capability) and had a slightly damaged Udaloy-class ASW destroyer. The TF had still 60-70% of her anti-shipping capacity, 100% of her submarine capability and Landing Force capability and probably 60% of her maritime Air Defense capability. NGS capability was down to 40-50%. NATO tried with very limited force (overstretched?) to interfere with this Soviet operation but was not very successful. However, if NATO assigns more attack missions to the cause that might change. NATO still has a submarine at the scene and the Soviet admiral has reasons to fear a second air attack on his landing area. He definitely needs Combat Air Patrol (CAP)!

Verdict. Naval Command 2021 has many playable components of modern maritime warfare! Within the last 2 games we really pushed it to the limits with our 'out-of-mind' amphibious landing (and connection with 6 mm Land miniatures), but so far we are pleasantly surprised. Naval Gunfire Support (NGS) by ships (or coastal guns firing at passing ships) worked very well (assuming the coastal gun has the same distance / damage factor as a naval gun with similar caliber)! Even the on-the-spot house rule regarding the use of sonobuoys seemed to work out and can also be adapted (longer/shorter than 10 nm, etc.). It requires more 'datapoints' (more wargaming) to find out which is the best. Eg. you could include not only passive sonobuoys, but also 1 or more active ones (which in reality are more expensive), which gives instantaneous a location of the submarine. And maybe we can find some unclassified examples of buoy-patterns, so that we get a better simulation of how large such a field is? However, Air Defense is an area in which, after 4-5 games using 'Naval Command 2021', I still seem to struggle applying the rules properly... This game, 3 issues surprised me (initially). 

Issue 1. A Nimrod at low height was shot down by a single-arm SA-N-7 fired by a Sovremenny at a range of 23 nm! SA-N-7 is according to the USSR Master list capable to fire up to medium range (which is max. 30 nm.). Remember, during Part 1 of this Campaign we already thought that the SA-N-7 range (up to medium range) is too optimistic! And... at medium range/low altitude the SA-N-7 has an AD-modifier of '3' (the highest number available within the table!). As a former Air Defence Officer I was surprised (again), so next day I started an investigation. This SA-N-7 rating surpasses even the SA-N-6 primary AD weapon of the Slava-class and Kirov-class cruisers (which has '2' for the whole medium range). According to the USSR Masterlist/AD weapons you are let to believe that SA-N-7 is the most potent Russian AD weapon (sarcasm alert). However, OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) says: SA-N-7 is the navalized version of the land-based 'Buk' AD system. There are 2 different missiles types: 9M38 and the more modern 9M317. The older one has a max. theoretical range of 30 km (16 nm.), the newer one of 50 km. (27 nm.). According to OSINT: practical range for these missiles, as claimed by the manufacturer(!), are 25 km versus high altitudes, 18 km. for targets below 1 km altitude and 12 km. versus inbound anti-ship missiles (6-7 nm.). This particular points out to 2 potential 'problems'. For AD, 'Naval Command 2021' works with 'range bands': Close (0-12 nm.), Medium (12-30 nm.) and Long (30-100 nm.). At first I assume that the quality rating for SA-N-7 is wrong, especially at medium range. But second, how do we take into account actual / realistic engagement ranges within those rather large & rude range bands? One could choose mentioning the actual ranges or.... one could decide to stick to the rude range bands, but rounding the range to the nearest range band limit. So the SA-N-7 should have had (in my opinion) an actual range of let say 7 nm. against anti-ship missiles or the whole range band of close range (< 12 nm). I assume that the 9M317 missile is for the more modern SA-N-12 version (onboard the newest Chinese Sovremenny's-class, Indian Talwar-class and Russian Grigorovich-class)?

Issue 2. In the game the Niels Juel-class corvette was unable to shoot down any SS-N-22 Sunburn. In my memory / professional experience those 3 Niels Juel-class units were reasonably armed. They were equipped with Mk 48 Mod 3 Vertical Launch System for RIM-7 NATO Sea Sparrow. However, looking into OSINT after this 1986 game, I realized that the Mk 48 VLS was installed not before 2000 and this midlife upgrade was (understandably) not yet mentioned in the Denmark Fleet List of 2021. The Fleet List described the original configuration: the 8 cell Mk 29 NATO Sea Sparrow trainable launcher. My memory / knowledge did let me down! I also saw that SS-N-22 Sunburn is rated within the game with a high & realistic defense rating of '13'. Given the low rating for the Air Defense radar of the Niels Juel-class ('1') and the lack of CIWS onboard it would be near impossible for her to defend against SS-N-22. However, looking further into the Denmark Master list for RIM-7 Sea Sparrow and looking into the fleet list entry for Niels Juel I spotted a mis-match. The Masterlist rates RIM-7 with: 2 (ss) 2 (low) 1 (medium) [which I understand with my missile knowledge], but the Niels Juel entries gives: 1 (ss), 2 (low), 2 (medium) [which I understand less]. The Master list of the USA gives the same rating as the Master list of Denmark, so is there a typo error at Niels Juel? Which didn't help her defense? If you read following point 3, you will understand that actually the ship was double 'handicapped': her lowest AD modifier for RIM 7 Sea Sparrow was for 'SS'.... 

Issue 3. The Sunburn engagement pointed another thing out to me. Apparently, according to the USSR Master list the SS-N-22 is a sea skimmer!? I was surprised to read that, so I looked into OSINT after the game (as I don't have acces to classified data anymore). Lots of websites copy each other and write down the (Russian) statement that it flies sea skimming at 7-20 meter altitude. A 4,000 kg missile at Mach 2,3 from the 1970s/1980s. I find it difficult to believe that... How to continuously compensate your altitude for sea state at that speed and the rude electronics of the altimeter? The subsonic and older SS-N-2, SS-N-7, SS-N-9 flew at 60-40 meters altitude (source: same OSINT), to prevent flying into the bumpy sea. Even modern supersonic Russian missiles have problems flying below 10 meters altitude... I found only a very few websites which stated that SS-N-22 flies at 20 m. height and after lock-on (missile radar activates at around 6-7 nm distance from expected target) it descends to 7 m. I expect that impact wil occur at 7 m. above the waterline, but that most of the trajectory it will fly at approx. 20 m. altitude. That is different than a sea skimming Harpoon or Exocet, I reckon. But thinking about it longer than a couple of seconds, you could - for the sake of sufficient game play- keep the missile description at 'SS' as the SS-N-22 remains a very difficult weapon (and the rule system doesn't take into account the high speed of some missile, resulting in less reaction time). Suggestion: use a footnote: 'missile rated as 'ss' due to supersonic speed, resulting in very limited reaction time'.

Additional USSR Fleet List pages for 'Naval Command 2021'

Based on our 1986 Amphibious Naval Wargames of the last months (and bought miniatures), I needed some additional Soviet/Russian ship descriptions in the USSR Fleet List of 'Naval Command 2021' Rule set. There are Grisha- & Grigorovich-class frigates, Alligator-, Polnocny- & AIST-class amphibious units, T-43 minesweeper and Don-, Berezina- & Boris Chilikin-class Naval Auxiliaries. They are posted on the 'Naval Command 2021' Facebook page; free to use and hopefully included/adapted in a future version of Naval Command.

Battle/1st Campaign Report: 1986 Soviet Amphibious Landing in Northern Germany ('Naval Command 2021' Rules) - Part 1

Recap: During the ‘table top’ exercise (see my BLOG October 10th, 2024) we determined how to conduct a Soviet Amphibious Landing in the Baltic on the West German Baltic Coast (1986 Cold War fictional scenario) within the rule set of Naval Command 2021. In October we concluded:
4 AIST-class air-cushion vehicles delivered 2x CIE Naval Inf. & 2x PLT Naval Inf.
6 Mi-8 transport helo’s delivered 6 PLT air assault (wave 1)
5 Ropucha-class LST’s delivered 3 CIE T-72 tanks, 2 CIE Naval Inf, 2 PLT recon & 2 PLT Anti-Air.
6 Mi-8 transports helo’s delivered another 6 PLT Air Assault (turn 5)
1 Alligator-class LST delivered: 1 artillery battery (6 guns) & 10 trucks
1 Ivan Rogov-class delivered 10 T-72 (1 CIE) & 30 BMP (vehicles for 1 BAT) & Commander Land Forces HQ
Reserve: 1 Alligator, loaded with 10 trucks, artillery battery (6x 2S1), field hospital.

On Sunday 1st december 2024 we played the same scenario, now under tactical circumstances. The Soviet Amphibious Taskgroup was almost the same, but now the West German coast would be defended by a West German submarine, a Brequet Atlantic MPA and NATO aircraft would be standing by to attack the Taskgroup when it was properly detected.
The Naval Wargame was conducted with 1:3000 ship miniatures and 1:600 aircraft on a 4 x 6 ft blue sea mat with a (cloth) 4 ft x 2 ft cm print of a beach superimposed over the short (4 ft) side of the sea mat. We used the Naval Command 2021 rule set; slightly adapted to our needs. Although I acquired 2 Soviet T-43 minesweepers since the last game, we didn’t look into mine warfare aspects. As targets for a possible ‘Naval gunfire support’ (NGS: artillery support by naval ships in support of the Land Forces (Chapter 32.2 and 32.3)) I had included a couple of 6 mm. Land Forces artillery pieces on an island in front of the coast. For submarine operations it was decided that all was ‘deep’, except near the coast or the island.

During Turn 1 NATO had the initiative. The German Brequet Atlantic was radar active patrolling the West German coast; the German Type 206 submarine (Type 209 NAVWAR) sat quiet in her submarine patrol zone near the island (blue flag in above picture). Of the Soviet Taskgroup only the Udaloy (upfront) and 1 Sovremenny (right flank) destroyer were radar active; the Udaloy was also active on sonar.
The German Type 206 passively detected the Udaloy active sonar at 25 nm. Also the Atlantic MPA detected the Udaloy; at 70 nm. by active radar. The Soviet Kilo-class upfront (red flag) was unable to passively detect the tiny German Type 206. However, the big sonar of the Udaloy was able to detect the Type 206, resulting in 1 marker. The Soviet Sovremenny detected the Atlantic MPA by active radar. No combat phase, but NATO got an enemy report from the Atlantic MPA that at least 2 Soviet destroyers were near the German coast. That triggered the planning for a possible NATO air attack on those vessels, as they might be part of the Soviet Taskgroup (of which NATO didn’t have an exact location).

During turn 2 USSR had the initiative. 2 Soviet Ka-27 ASW helo’s deployed to the front of the ASW-screen around the Soviet Taskgroup, to investigate the initial sonarcontact by the Udaloy destroyer. The Taskgroup proceeded as planned. The Atlantic MPA descended to ‘low’ and turned towards the 2 Soviet radar contacts, keeping out of their AAW weapons. The MPA detected the Berezina-class tanker at 70 nm. The German Type 206 moved silently towards the Udaloy and detected the Soviet Kilo-class submarine as well. The Kilo-class was not able to detect the much smaller Type 206 submarine. The Udaloy was unable to remain in sonar contact with the type 206. Both Ka-27 ASW helo’s were struggling to get sonar contact at the Type 206 as well.
Based on the detection of 2 Soviet destroyers and their tanker, surrounded by a couple of unidentified radar contacts, it was decided by NATO that the Soviet Taskgroup had been found and a detailed air-attack planning started.

During Turn 3 USSR kept the initiative. The Udaloy ASW-destroyer closed in at the silent German Type 206. The Soviet Krivak 2 ASW-frigate at the opposite flank became active on sonar and radar and maintained position. The Taskgroup proceeded towards the German coast. Frustated activated the Soviet Kilo-class submarine her powerful sonar, to try to find the Type 206… The Atlantic MPA flew towards the Kilo-class, but had to stay outside the AAW-‘umbrella’ of the Soviet Udaloy. In the meantime the Atlantic detected the Krivak 2. Although considered a very bold move, the Kilo-class sub was able to detect the Type 206. Worse, also the Udaloy detected the type 206 again. Three markers, the German sub was located; 20 nm. away from the SSN-14 equipped Udaloy. During the combat phase only the Udaloy was able to fire: 2 SSN-14 on the location of the Type 206: both missed, due to countermeasures deployed by Type 206 and/or dodgy firing solutions. The NATO air attack planning was still ongoing.

During turn 4 USSR kept the initiative. The Type 206 dived below the thermocline layer to ‘deep’. Initially all Soviet units lost sonar contact on her. Unfortunately, the Udaloy found the sub again quickly. A Ka-27 ASW helo closed in on this position. The Type 206 detected a nearby Sovremenny destroyer. The Atlantic MPA kept her distance towards the Soviet AAW-capable warships and could not detect or attack the Soviet Kilo-class. During the combat phase the nearby Ka-27 helo attacked the Type 206 with 2 homing torpedo’s. 1 hit, resulting in 1 Fire and 2 structure damage markers. The continuing fire resulted in a third structural damage marker. Damage control by the tiny sub didn’t help. She was crippled and couldn’t perform her mission…

During turn 5 USSR kept the initiative. More combatants within the Soviet Taskgroup went ‘active’, as the flagship (Sverdlov-class cruiser) was convinced a NATO airstrike on the Task Group was a strong possibility. Both Grisha-class ASW-frigates became ‘active’, as well as the old Kashin-class AAW destroyer. The Taskgroup was now protected by 2 Sovremenny destroyers (SA-N-7 AAW-system), 1 Udalaoy (SA-N-9 VLS), 1 Kashin (SA-N-1) and several SA-N-4 capable ships (Krivak 2, Grisha). The Soviets kept hunting the crippled Type 206. A second Ka-27 fired 2 torpedo’s at her and she sank. However, during the ASW hunt the Udaloy did close the German island within 20 nm. The unknown and undetected deployed 152 mm howitzers opened fire on the Udaloy at 17 nm and did hit her once, resulting in 1 fire damage and 2 structural damage. Her helo pad was therefore destroyed. Still no sight of a NATO air attack.

During turn 6 USSR kept the initiative (again!). The NATO strike package (4 Buccaneers with a total of 16 Sea Eagle ASM, protected by a pair of Harrier FRS-1) showed up. Split into 2 flights and moved into position at very low level. 

The Udaloy - on fire- tried to move away from the hostile island. During the combat phase 2 Buccaneers fired at the 2 front Ropucha-class LST’s. The other 2 Buccaneers fired from the left flank towards the Sverdlov Cruiser (assessed to be the flagship) and 1 of the 2 Moskva-class helicopter cruisers. Following the Naval Command 2021 Rule Set, a lot of Soviet ships were able to shoot at the incoming Sea Eagle anti-ship missiles. Mind you, these were crossing targets (and not incoming targets) for most of the time, outside -real world- max. range of those Soviet AAW weapons. I can’t imagine that a AIST air cushion vehicle can hit a passing subsonic Sea Eagle at 4-5 nm with her radar guided AK 230 (30 mm. self defense gun; actual range < 1,5 nm); but according to the rules she can (Rule: this system can hit within 12 nm.- CLOSE RANGE)! And those 2 single-arm SA-N-7 systems of a Sovremenny did fire many SA-N-7’s at crossing targets at a range of > 12 nm. (Rules: at MEDIUM range < 30 nm.). A more realistic range of SA-N-7 against crossing targets is prob. <12 nm. I think ‘Naval Command 2021’ is too optimistic about Russian AAW and doesn’t take into account Rate of fire and/or the amount of fire channels… 

Anyhow, the Sverdlov cruiser was substantial damaged by 2 Sea Eagles, but the 12 Sea Eagles aimed at the Ropucha’s and the Moskva-class cruiser were all ‘splashed’ (even by very old SA-N-1, SA-N-3, SA-N-4 or AK-230). 

And then we went for dinner - real world. Which was the end of this tactical game.

This enjoyable Naval Wargame took us approx. 4 hours to play. There was no time left to conduct the actual landing at the beach or to conduct Naval Gunfire Support… The plan is therefor to play ‘Part 2’ of this game on December 15th and start closer to the German coast (in order to conduct the actual landing). I assume we leave the damaged Sverdlov-class out of the equation but keep the slightly damaged Udaloy in …

Preparation for ‘Part 2’:
- prepare missing Ship Data Cards for: T-43 minesweeper, Polnocny LCT, Grisha ASW-corvette, Berezina-class tanker.
- think about some (temporary?) base for all the Landing Ships of the Task Group. So you have to move 1 large base, instead of lots of individual ships.

Additional Remarks, after some investigation (some days later).

I looked into the actual ranges (and reaction times) of the Soviet Naval SAM-systems: SA-N-1, SA-N-3 and SA-N-4 are probably unable to fire at a sea skimming 'Sea Eagle' missile. For rate of fire: SA-N-4 twin launcher: 2 missiles/min. reload time SA-N-7 (Sovremenny) single-arm launcher: 24 sec! Max. distance AK-630/AK-230 and SA-N-5/8 against air targets: approx 2 nm. Max. range SA-N-4 and SA-N-7: 7 nm. Verdict: most of the Sea Eagles couldn't be hit and would probably reach their targets... with severe hits on 2 Ropucha's, 1 Sverdlov and 1 Moskva-class.
    

Attribution of Naval Command 2021 Fleet Lists: developing the Taiwan scenario

In October 2024 I decided to contribute to improving the Naval Wargame Rule book 'Naval Command 2021'. Also to help the author, as he is working on an update. With my knowledge of the Royal Dutch Navy I proposed some additions for the Fleet list of the Netherlands. My input can be found on the Facebook page 'Naval Command - Modern Naval Wargame Rules'. 

The proposed additions concerned inclusion of 1950s cruiser class and submarine classes. And 1990's Air Defense frigates, fast combat support ship and minesweeper class. As these ship models (scale 1:3000) can be bought from NAVWAR, we can use them in our naval war games but ship data cards (fleet list entry) for them were missing…

Along a similar line of thinking I proposed to develop the fleet list for Taiwan. Based on a possible future Chinese invasion of the Island around 2030? Anyhow, the fleet list of China was included in the 2021 version of Naval Command, but Taiwan wasn't. The fleet lists of Taiwan's presumed allies, like USA, Japan, Australia and maybe some European countries, were already available within the Rule Book. Assuming Taiwan had a navy build up from ex-US ships (and the odd Dutch submarine) I thought this contribution to the Rule Book was easy…. At the same time I ordered from NAVWAR the ex-US, ex-French and ex-NLD ships, from which I could compose the Taiwanese fleet.  I discovered that most manufacturers had modern US navy ships available, but no modern Chinese's or Russian ships (after the year 2000)!
While making the Taiwan fleet list I discovered that Taiwan has a very active armamant industry, which is capable of adapting her second-hand warships with more modern sensors and indigenous weapons systems. In such way that I couldn't simply copy the US fleet list to describe the Taiwanese ex-US Knox-class frigates, the Taiwanese version of the Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates, etc.. I had to adapt their entries in the Fleet List thoroughly, as their sensor and weapon-ratings differed. Understandingly, the NAVWAR US, French and Dutch miniature models didn't reflect the typical Taiwanese modernizations. Luckily, as these models are scale 1:3000, this omission was not so visible. And I found some aircraft 1:600 ​​manufacturers, who could provide Taiwanese MD-500 ASW helos, a P-3C MPA, F-16s etc.
Anyhow, my best shot at those Taiwanese ships has been published on the Facebook page in Oct/Nov 2024. Hopefully they will be included in a future update of 'Naval Command’.

A bigger challenge I faced with the Chinese (and Russian) fleet. Although modern ship classes are described in the Naval Command Fleet List (like Chinese aircraft carriers, type 075 amphibious assault ships, type 052D & 055 destroyers and type 054 frigates) there is no 1:3000 manufacturer who makes these modern ones. And with the demise of 3D printing platform 'Shapeways' (since July '24) I didn't find someone who was able to produce/print modern Chinese destroyer-, frigate- and amphibious-class vessels at scale 1:3000. The only option was to buy modern 1:2400 scale ships from XP Forge and/or GHQ (both: USA). But those are 20% bigger! The 20% excess in size is very visible when it is a large ship (LPD, cruiser, carrier). Smaller ship-classes (frigate, LST, etc.) don't look so big, as they are not bigger than 1:3000 cruisers, LPDs and carriers… In the picture below, the fully painted Chinese ships (carrier & Luhu class destroyer) are scale 1:3000. The plain grey ships (LPD, frigate & LST) are 1:2400.

Anyhow, with some knowledge of those Asian Navies I collected over the last 2 months the following:
Taiwan: all submarine classes, most of the destroyer and frigate-classes, together with 1 ex-US Newport LST (all NAVWAR or DAVCO 1:3000 ) and 1 P-3C Orion MPA and a couple of F-16s. MD-500 helos (to operate from frigates) still to be painted…

China: some submarine classes (SSN & diesel), some destroyer and frigate classes (type 051, 052, 053H3, Sovremenny - all NAVWAR), 1 type 052C destroyer, 1 type 071 LPD and 2 type 072 LSTs (all 4 scale 1: 2400), 1 tanker (ex-USSR) and 1 Type 002 carrier (Kuznetsov by NAVWAR).
USA: some submarine classes, 1 LHD, lots of Aegis cruisers/destroyers, 2 San Antonio class LPDs, 8 LCACs - in use with USA, and some tankers (all NAVWAR or DAVCO 1:3000):
Japan: some submarine classes (Fujimi), 2 Aegis Kongo-class destroyers (NAVWAR), some older destroyers.
South Korea: 3 KDX-1 destroyers, 1 Type 209 submarine (all NAVWAR)
North Korea: 2 Romeo-class diesel submarines (NAVWAR, Russian fleet)
Australia: 1 ex-US Newport LST and a 1950s destroyer.

Besides this I have lots of Soviet ships, but not newer ones like Gorshkov- and Grigorovich-class frigates. Anyhow I still need to buy 1:600 ​​modern aircraft, like (US/Japan/AUS F-35 and Chinese aircraft/helo's). Luckily I already have 2 P-8 Poseidon 1:600 ​​MPA's (from Shapeway's), which can be flown by USA, UK or Australia. And I have lots of helos (and LCAC's - in use with US & Japan) to conduct a Western amphibious landing on the Taiwanese coast during Spring 2025?

Comparison between 'Shipwreck' (1999) and 'Naval Command 2021'

- slightly adapted text, based on discussions at Facebook Group 'Modern Naval Gaming' (Okt 2024) -

Shipwreck.

The naval wargame ‘Shipwreck’ dates from 1999 and was written by Martin Bourne. It is available at www.wargamevault.com, can be used for all common model scales and has a number of expansion packs: the specific wargame rules (paid PDF), (free) ship data cards (with a thematic top view of the ship, on which you can insert battle damage and see weapon fire arcs), grouped by continent, 4 scenarios (paid PDFs: 2 in the Mediterranean and 2 in the Persian Gulf), a submarine expansion pack (paid PDF) and a paid PDF

‘Freeplay ’88’ (actually the NATO exercise Teamwork ’88). The 50-page rulebook contains all rules, gives advice on how to paint miniatures (2 pages), a quick reference card (2 pages), a damage card (1 page showing weapon effects vs. ship types), 4 pages explanation of a 5-turn battle between 4 ships and has tables to look up essential information about weapon systems (6 pages, picture above), aircraft & helicopters (3 pages) and submarines (1 page); in order to calculate detection chances and hit chances. A turn consists of 4 phases: movement, damage control, detection and combat phase. There is no dice rolling for initiative! No use of actual ranges of radars and weapon systems, but these are divided into 6 range bands: very short (4 nm.), short (4-12 nm), medium (12-25 nm), long range (25-85 nm.), very long (85-150 nm.) and extreme (>150 nm.). ‘Shipwreck’ pays limited attention to the different ship speeds.

‘Shipwreck’ is primarily focused on surface ships, how they fight each other and how they defend themselves against missiles. This is also reflected in the (paid) scenarios offered. ‘Shipwreck’ has a soft spot for Electronic Warfare (EW): you can defend yourself with softkill (chaff, IR flares) and there is a lot of attention for the detection phase. ‘Shipwreck’ pays much less attention to submarines, Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), aircraft and/or Air-to-Air engagements. It lacks any ships/aircraft datacards from the 21st century.

Naval Command 2021

This is the 2021 version of ‘Naval Command’ (the 3rd version of ‘Naval Command’?). An improved version is reportedly being worked on. The rules were written by Rory Crabb. It is available at www.wargamevault.com, can be used for all common model scales and has 1 (paid) expansion pack: Falklands 1982 (30 pages with 10 scenarios, 1 campaign and a fleet list of UK and Argentina). However the Falklands Supplement was issued in 2020 and therefor uses the former ruleset (and discarded concepts such as 'construction rating' and 'data points'). There exists a not very active Facebook page, where updates can be downloaded. The rulebook of over 40 pages contains all the rules supplemented by many explanatory pictures regarding maritime tactics. These 40 pages seems less than 'Shipwreck' but it is not: ‘Shipwreck’ has only 20 pages of proper regulations, the remaining are tables and info that ‘Naval Command’ has organized in a different way (including the Ship Data Cards/Fleet list of over 200 pages, included in the Rulebook). Besides Surface Warfare, ‘Naval Command 2021’ also focuses on Rules of Engagement, air warfare, submarine warfare, sea mines, piracy, amphibious operations, and the use of nuclear weapons. The fleet lists (Ship data cards) contain many more modern ships/aircraft/armament, including those from the 21st century. Damage is dealt by rolling dice and is indicated with counters.

A turn consists of 6 phases: initiative, sensor status, navigation, detection, combat phase, damage control. In general, actual ranges of weapon systems are used, but not radars/ sensors. Sensors and Air Defense uses only 3 range bands: close (0-12 nm), intermediate (12-30 nm), long range (30-100 nm.). ‘Naval Command 2021’ takes into account different ship speeds.

This wargame pays equal attention to surface warfare, air warfare, and submarine warfare. In my opinion, ‘Naval Command’ handles Electronic Warfare differently: during Air Defense, there is no specific attention to softkill (chaff, IR flares, jammer), but there is much confidence in the EW capabilities of modern units: a good EW rating apparently makes it possible to avoid/influence radar detection (I am wondering: are you supposed to jam that search radar?) or to mislead (ditto, generation of decoys?).

General impression of both games:

Both games are kept as simple as possible, so that you can play them 'quickly'. Each game consists of turns, each of which is built up of different phases. However, a game of 6-10 turns might last several hours, especially if you do not yet master the rules. The much more expensive and more extensive naval wargame 'Harpoon V' is more a proper simulation, taking into account many more issues & details. 'Harpoon V' therefore takes much longer. The rulebook of 'Naval Command 2021' explains much better war at sea than 'ShipWreck'. And 'Shipwreck' has no standard provision which player has initiative during a turn. All together, with more aspects of maritime warfare and more modern units, 'Naval Command 2021' is preferable to 'Shipwreck'. Financially, both wargames are not expensive, unless you buy all the expansion packs of ‘Shipwreck’.

Comparison of ship data cards:

The free ship data cards of ‘Shipwreck' (picture above) are about warships from Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Cuba, Denmark, Germany, Ecuador, Philippines, Finland, France, Greece, Great Britain, Ireland, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Soviet Union, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela, the US, South Korea, Sweden. Yugoslavia (or Serbia) and India are sorely missed. The expansion packs will probably contain the relevant countries, such as Iran, Iraq, Israel and Libya (?). For important countries there are cards of warships from 1950-1990; some smaller countries fare worse. Not all auxiliary warships (tankers, etc.) are available and there is no attention to merchant ships. Data on aircraft is limited and can be found in tables of the game rules. You have to figure out for yourself which armament can be carried by which aircraft. The data card itself provides additional information (compared to ‘Naval Command’) regarding weapon fire arcs and offers the possibility to record damage. You could make additional data cards of missing ships yourself, but then you have to estimate what the EW value, Radar value and sonar value of the relevant ship classes are. This requires quite a bit of maritime inside information, which most players do not have.
The supplied data cards of ‘Naval Command 2021’ concern warships and aircraft of the same countries, except: Belgium, Chile, Cuba, Ecuador, Philippines, Finland, Ireland, Indonesia, Libya, Mexico, New Zealand, Portugal, Singapore, Uruguay, Venezuela, South Korea. But information on China, India and merchant ships is provided. However Yugoslavia/Serbia, Libya and Venezuela are sorely missed here (again).

The datacards of ‘Naval Command’ (right picture) cover more modern ships and aircraft than those of ‘Shipwreck’. ‘Shipwreck’ focuses on 1960-1990, ‘Naval Command’ on 1975-2015. Naval Command provides common armament of aircraft. What is often missing from ships is the number of gun positions and their weapon arcs. The latter apparently plays no role in the game (in ‘Shipwreck’ this detailed information does play a role). Here too, it applies that you could make missing datacards yourself, but then you have to estimate which EW value, Acoustic signature, acoustic noise, damage, radar and sonar qualities these units have. You need much more detailed knowledge of ships and warfare for this than in ‘Shipwreck’ and it is unfeasible for the average wargamer. ‘Naval Command’ in particular has an annoying number of typing and reasoning errors in the datacards. 

Verdict: Both wargames have their good and bad sides regarding datacards. They are sometimes good in specific countries and/or specific time periods.

Detection phase comparison:

In modern naval wargames this is an important phase. How much data do you need to achieve a successful detection? How many times do you have to roll the dice and how complex are the calculations? Etc.

In ‘Shipwreck’ only 2 pages in the rule book are devoted to radar detection. Detection can take place in the maneuver and/or combat phase. Ships must indicate during detection phase which sensors are active. There is also an ‘emergency activation’ option anytime, but then you have to keep the radar active for 1 extra run (so that the enemy can detect it in the next detection phase). Ships are allowed multiple detection attempts within a phase (so against multiple ‘targets’), aircraft generally only 1x against 1 ‘target’. That seems logical to me because ships have more personnel, radar screens and situational awereness. Passive detection is always allowed. Active radar detections from ships against other ships can only take place within 25 nm. (radar horizon). From aircraft within 85 nm. (long range). Passive detection is 1 range band further (rightly so). A 90% detection probability is assumed, to which 8 (sometimes potential) modifiers apply, which include the radar quality of the transmitting ship, the EW quality of the reflecting ship, the size of the reflecting ship, whether it concerns a passive detection, etc. The calculated detection probability value must be thrown with a D10 dice. If the calculated value is not thrown, no detection has taken place. ‘Shipwreck’ has only 1 page for sonar detection. The sonar detection logic is similar to radar detection logic.

‘Shipwreck’ has specific rules on how a detection can be reported to other ships: via data link (immediately) or via radio (can only be done the next turn; so it resembles a telex message?). In ‘Naval Command 2021’ 2,5 pages are devoted to radar detection and 2 pages to sonar detection. Detection seems only be possible during detection phase within a turn. The rules assume that after the initiation phase all ships will become active (which is tactically not smart…)! If you want to activate your radars outside the initiation phase, you have to roll for them… All units are apparently only allowed to do 1 detection/turn, passive or active (surprisingly no distinction is made between a modern multi-radar/radarband warship with lots of radar screens, 360 degrees radar view and computer power and a 2-person simple helicopter with1 forward looking I band radar system). A nice/realistic feature of ‘Naval Command 2021’ is the use of ‘contact markers’. In this case, the actual ship is not shown, but only a number/digit in that position. The actual ship (and therefore the identity) is only shown when it is detected. Detections are made in only 3 range bands (close, intermediate and long range). The radar horizon is almost the same (30 nm. at ‘Naval Command 2021') and the range extension due to passive detection is also 1 band further. A D10 is rolled, whereby only 3 modifiers need to be applied: the search radar quality of the transmitting ship, a distance-dependent modifier and possibly a weather-dependent modifier. The result of this is held against the EW value of the object to be detected: if the result >  EW value, detection is successful. For passive detection, there is a similar comparison, but then with only 2 modifiers, such as ESM value of the detecting ship. For sonar detections, 'Naval Command 2021' takes into account if the submarine is above or under the thermocline layer. 'Naval Command 2021' does not roll for the proper functioning of the data link; it is assumed that it always works.

Verdict: In 'Shipwreck' you do a lot of mental arithmetic, with a mathematical equation of '9' -/+ various 8 modifiers. In 'Naval Command' the number of modifiers is less, which makes the calculation easier. I also really like the feature of 'contact markers' at the beginning of the game. However, the rules for active and passive radar detection in 'Naval Command' are far too restrictive for modern ships. During a game of ‘Naval Command 2021’, detection of relatively modern helicopters (due to their high EW value) turned out to be very difficult; much more difficult than in 'Shipwreck'. Given the advantage of modern radars, the detection chance of ‘Shipwreck’ seems more realistic to me (together with their more realistic rules). Neither 'Shipwreck' nor 'Naval Command' have the option to detect a submarine periscope with radar.

Combat phase comparison:

In ‘Shipwreck’ Rule Book 5 pages are devoted to combat between surface ships and/or defense against air attacks. One page is the damage table. I found the explanation too brief/not clear enough. However, with the 2 page engagement example (5 turns) a lot became clear! Combat takes place in the combat phase; annoying is that ships are no longer allowed to maneuver in that phase - only missiles and (attack) aircraft maneuver in this phase. According to the rules you have to take into account the limited weapon arcs of your armament, but you are no longer allowed to make a maneuver during the flight time of an enemy missile (this flight time can take several minutes!) to optimize your fire sectors. In the real world, attacked ships maneuver at top speed during such an attack.

Missiles/attack aircraft jump from range band to range band; each range band you have 1 chance to defend yourself. If you fire multiple missiles at the attackers within that band, you must use a negative modifier (intended to save ammunition). There are rules for the use of anti-aircraft missiles, for the use of cannons and for the use of softkill (chaff). The hit probability calculation for air defense is as follows: from the table you get the anti-air value of the anti-aircraft missile to be used, some modifiers are applied to it (e.g. the EW value of the target). The rolled D10 (per anti-aircraft missile to be used) must reach that number ('final anti-air factor') (or lower), otherwise it is wrong. Ideally, the D10 must roll 2 numbers lower than the final anti-air factor. If just above that, aircraft are only chased away. For missiles (cannot be chased away), you must always roll < final anti-air factor-2. Attention is also paid to the success factor of chaff and the possibility that a missile flies through a chaff cloud and then finds a new target! (real situation).

Deployment of anti-ship missiles is initially easier: if you have detected a target and you are ‘in range’, you fire them. Per range band they jump to the target (while the attacked ship tries to detect them and starts shooting at them). Only when your missiles have defeated the enemy air defense, the hit probability calculation starts: look up the anti-ship factor of your missiles in the table, apply modifiers (including EW value of target ship). The thrown D10 (per missile) must reach this number (or lower) to hit the target. Then your opponent looks in the damage table (tonnage of target ship vs damage effect of the anti-ship weapon used) what the consequences could be. Then your opponent throws a D10 to see what the actual damage is. The result can be recorded on the ship data card.

In ‘Naval Command 2021’ at least 12 pages are used to describe the different combat possibilities. For each type, there are handy process cards included in the book. The explanation is more extensive and easier to understand. Here too, combat only takes place in the combat phase. Because the ship data cards do not take into account the weapon arcs of the ship's armament, this is not an issue in the combat phase (as it was in ‘Shipwreck’).

Missiles/attack aircraft jump from range band to range band (there are only 3; in ‘Shipwreck’ usually more); each range band you have a chance to defend yourself; it is not clearly indicated that you can only fire once per band at a specific target. However, ‘Air Defence Markers’ (Chapter 19.3) are used to simulate the saturation of the anti-aircraft ‘bubbles’. Every time an anti-aircraft system is deployed, it gets a negative modifier on the chance of hitting the target the next time (within that turn!). This looks similar to 'Shipwreck', but is slightly different. It is assumed that you have to apply those 'AD markers' per ship instead of per weapon system (type) of a ship. If the AD Markers are applied to all Air Defense bubbles around the ship you would only be able to shoot 3 or 4 times before the ship is 'saturated'. I consider it would be more realistic if AD markers are assigned to specific air defense systems (or just assigned to 1 range shell): so in the largest bubble you fire your long range AD system until saturation, then your medium system in the smaller bubble and then your close system in the smallest bubble. 'Naval Command 2021' unfortunately has no specific rules for softkill (chaff) and does not mention DP gun systems under Air Defense Systems within the Fleet Lists! Therefor I made the mistake to forget about them during play! There are combat rules for the use of anti-aircraft missiles, for the use of guns against ships (chapter 23), for the use of anti-ship missiles (chapter 20), for anti-submarine weapons (chapter 22), for air attacks with rockets/bombs (chapter 25), for sea mines (chapter 29) and even nuclear weapons (chapter 30).

The hit probability determination for air defense is as follows: the result of the D10 roll (per air defense weapon system) is provided with the positive Defense Radar modifier (of the firing ship), from which the numbers of AD markers are subtracted. This ‘result’ is held against the ‘defense rating’ of the attacking aircraft/missile (see datacard). If the adjusted dice value > then defense rating = air target destroyed. Of course you must then assign a new AD marker.

Deployment of anti-ship missiles is also easy: if you are ‘in range’, you must roll the dice to see if you (or your on-board helicopter) have detected the target ship; D10 value + fire control radar of the detecting platform is held against the EW value of the enemy ship. If it exceeds that EW value, it has been detected and the anti-ship weapons can be fired. A bearing only launch is also possible, on passive radar info. After the opponent has done his air defense, the final lock rule follows: D10 + accuracy rating of the missile must exceed the EW value of the target to score a hit. Then the damage must be rolled (Chapter 27). Something strange is going on here: there are 4 types of damage (fire, flood, systems & structures) mentioned in the Rules but in the table ‘systems’ does not appear anymore… Damage control is described in Chapter 28 (1 page).

Verdict: Combat in ‘Shipwreck’ is limited in diversity; ‘Naval Command 2021’ has many more types of combat, which gives it more possibilities, also for the future (sea mine warfare, piracy of merchant ships, etc.). Within ‘Naval Command 2021’ you can use more weapon types (despite the lack of usage of EW weapons), which makes underwater warfare, air warfare or even amphibious operations really possible. However, a source of concern is the current use of ‘Air Defence Markers’; this may adversely affect the playing of Air Defence compared to ‘Shipwreck’.

Final verdict: both Modern Naval Wargame rules are well suited for post-WWII naval wargaming in the scales 1:1800, 1:2400 or 1:3000. A game can be completed within a few hours. ‘Shipwreck’ focuses on wargaming with surface ships in the period 1960-1990; ‘Naval Command 2021’ focuses on the period 1975-2015 and has many more types of maritime warfare. Although ‘Naval Command’ is the better candidate (and is still in development), it has more ‘minor flaws’ than ‘Shipwreck’ and ship data from about 15 countries less than ‘Shipwreck’. 

Since a couple of months we use ‘Naval Command 2021’. We use the rules from the book, except for the following:

• we replaced the restrictions on the very limited number of radar and/or sonar detections per turn with: each ship/submarine may make as many detections in 1 turn as the value of its Search radar, ESM system or sonar system. In this way, modern computerized/ automated warships are able to detect more opponents than much older warships from the 1960s.
• we apply the rules regarding Defence Markers for air defense system (type) separately (and not for the ship as a whole), assuming that the use of these AD systems does not affect each other as they use their own Fire Control channels and ammunition.
• we assume that to turn off a radar, you are only allowed to do that during the Initiative Phase.
• we use DP guns also as (separate!) Air Defense Systems (at close/low range), especially against helo's, aircraft and older ant-ship missiles.